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Introduction:* Political Integration, Institutional Reform and the Crisis of 
Legitimacy
In the 1990s we have witnessed a major transformation in the nature of 
European integration: the gradual emergence an agenda for the ‘constitutional 
reform’ of the European Union. After the ratification debates which followed 
the signing of the Maastricht, the Reflection Group (Council of the European 
Union, 1995) helped to set the agenda for the 1996-97 Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC). There was great diversity in the kind of solutions which 
were expected from the 1997 Amsterdam Summit which concluded this 
particular round of reform. But a reform agenda which centres on the issues of 
democracy and effectiveness has undoubtedly emerged. The Amsterdam Treaty 
essentially deals with the fundamental structural arrangements for future EU 
decision-making. This, in itself, is no small matter: it indicates that we are 
witnessing not only a quickening of structural reform in the EC/EU - indeed a 
trend towards continuous reform - but also a move away from the pre­
occupation with policy (Single Market, EMU) in past IGCs, towards a 
genuinely institutional reform. It seems as if the EC/EU has gone full circle: 
after the 1955 EPC/EDC failure there was the move away from political 
integration and a concentration on the laborious process of market integration 
(customs union, ‘1992’ programme, EMU), only to return in the 1990s to 
confront the accumulated back-log of ‘political’ and institutional issues.
Market integration has been extremely successful. Yet the very success of 
progressive tariff reduction and de-regulation, it has been argued, was in part 
made possible because a parallel movement towards the establishment of 
accountable, political structures was lacking (Moravcsik, 1993). In such 
accounts, striking fundamental inter-state bargains - such as customs 
union/CAP and Single Act/structural fund reform - was only possible because 
decision-makers operated in closed session, insulated from national publics. 
The decision among Member States in March 1996 not to allow the 
participation, or even a simple observation role for Members of the European 
Parliament at the 1996 IGC indicates how secretive the inter-state bargaining 
process still is.
But the very success of ‘indirect’ integration - reaching an "ever-closer 
union" through market and legal integration - has forced the ‘political’, 
institutional questions back onto the centre stage of Union reform. Much of the 
1996-97 IGC was, in fact, an exercise in damage control. ‘Amsterdam’ was
* This paper draws to a large extent on a chapter that is forthcoming in M.Nentwich and A.Weale (eds.), The 
Political Theory o f  European Constitutional Choice (London: Routledge). It was first presented at a workshop at 
the ECPR Joint Sessions in Oslo, 1996. Thanks are due to Micheal Nentwich, Albert Weale and the workshop 



























































































meant to pick up Maastricht’s unfinished business: since the political union 
negotiations leading to the TEU were hurriedly and unsatisfactorily brought to a 
close, Member States agreed to launch a revision and stock-taking IGC in 1996. 
More importantly, there were the lessons learned after the signing of Maastricht 
- that it is not legitimate to join essential state functions such as monetary policy 
cannot be joined irrevocably, if not, at some stage, accountable political 
institutions, and public awareness of their efficiency, are built up. Beyond this 
concern with legitimating past achievements, ‘Amsterdam’ was also, indeed 
above all, a piece of anticipatory damage control: the reformed treaty has sought 
to prepare the EU’s decision-making system with the kind of structures and 
procedures that are needed for the next round of enlargement.
There are a number of ways in which the legitimation of the European 
construction can be approached: this paper concentrates on one key institution, 
the European Commission. In doing so, it seeks to show that for the legitimation 
of its complex institutional structure the European Union cannot rely on one­
dimensional domestic analogies. To this end, this paper provides a critique of 
some of the conventional writings on the Union’s ‘democratic deficit’. The 
paper is structured in three parts. First, the normative basis underlying the 
discussion of constitutional choice is spelled out. A second part examines the 
requirements of legitimising European governance against the background of 
problems with standard theories of majoritarian democracy. The model of 
legitimation of European integration developed here is then applied to the 
specific institutional arrangements which concern the European Commission. 
The conclusion considers proposals for a resolution of this dilemma against the 
background of the Amsterdam Treaty.
Normative Foundations of European Integration
Debating European constitution choices necessarily involves certain value- 
judgements about European governance. Any discussion of the legitimacy of 
European governance ought to spell out its assumptions with regard to the 
normative basis of integration. It is only following such a clarification that a 
discussion of the EU’s reform debate can be sensibly engaged and that ‘better’ 
constitutional solutions can be proposed. This section discusses three basic 
premises about the nature of integration which are guiding the subsequent 
discussion: first, European integration is of independent normative value above 
and beyond the benefits it provides to specific states, groups and individuals. 
Second, integration must be understood as an open-ended process rather than 
the emergence of a set of institutions and policies; third, European integration is 




























































































Each of these assumptions has important repercussions for the subsequent 
discussion of legitimacy in the European Union.
The first of these points, the independent value of European integration, is 
perhaps the most contentious. Yet looking at the origins and early history of the 
European Community it is evident that West European integration was, for a 
significant period of time, regarded as something more than merely a utility 
maximisation of national interests. The idea of European integration was one of 
superseding competition and conflict between nation-states by replacing the 
state-system with a qualitatively different system. Many saw this as a federal 
project, but as this proved to be far-reaching, recourse was made to functional 
integration. Subsequently, the normative aspect of the European idea - indeed 
the European idea itself - were largely lost from view as the emphasis was on 
functional logic and national interests. Yet it is crucial for this understanding of 
integration that the functional path has merely been the method rather than the 
aim, of European integration.
Elevating the process of integration to such a normative position is not to 
say that the EU is superior to the nation-state as a framework for problem­
solving, or that its output is inevitably good. Indeed, below this paper will 
discuss in some detail both the continuous significance of states in Western 
Europe and the pathologies of European policy-making. But neither can the 
value of integration be judged solely by looking at the short-term benefits which 
states seek and derive from membership. During the functional, ‘non-political’ 
phase of the Community, the value of closer integration was presented in such 
utilitarian terms. Membership in the Community, and the further development 
of its policy-instruments would increase trade, economic growth and global 
competitiveness. While this might, on the whole, well be the case, it has made 
the justification of further integration difficult when, or where, these benefits 
have not been forthcoming.
If integration is justified in purely utilitarian terms, the fundamental value of 
an enduring and stable framework of inter-state cooperation based on the rule of 
law is largely lost. To point out that the initial function of integration was to 
foreclose the potentiality of renewed war between Germany and France seems 
almost nonsensical in the 1990s. Yet the issue of German unification in 1990 
has emphasised the significance of a strong and stable European architecture 
capable of absorbing the shocks of change in Central and Eastern Europe. There 
are probably many examples of the way in which the process of integration has 
helped to pacify domestic or inter-state conflicts (such as Belgian territorial 




























































































integration and the preoccupation with national interests has helped to obscure 
the long-term significance of European integration.
The stability which integration has brought to European politics is not so 
much the consequence of current agreement among member states as it results 
from the accumulated experience of a legal and institutional framework that has 
been built up over the past 45 years. The characteristics which are specific to 
European integration - the degree of transparency it has brought to international 
politics, the rule of law it has established in inter-state relations, the scale of 
administrative and commercial interaction it has generated - make this a 
normatively valuable framework for political decision-making.
Clearly, there are limits to the transparency and the rule of law in the EU, as 
there are serious limits to democratic participation. But a normative judgement 
must be based on comparison with a credible alternative to the path of 
integration which has been followed. The most likely alternative to functional 
integration is the persistence of a state-centred system in which decision­
making would be much less democratic, transparent, justiciable and efficient. 
Seen in this light, the critique of the Union’s ‘democratic deficit’ for a further 
démocratisation of the EU is only credible if it is based on an affirmation rather 
than a rejection of the integration process. Dismissing the European project 
because of a perceived lack of democratic procedures is, consequently, 
misplaced.
The normative value of European integration can therefore be derived from 
arguments about the accountability, transparency and effectiveness which the 
process has brought to the international relations of the region. These are moral 
categories which are usually invoked by those who criticise the democratic 
credentials of the European integration. Yet, even though a normative defence 
of integration based on liberal ideals is possible, this must remain an assertion 
rather than reasoning. This is because the arguments provided here will not 
convince those for whom the nation-state is a value in itself. Nationality 
remains a normative category of its. To those who consider nationality rather 
than democracy the normative foundation of government, there is nothing in the 
process of European integration which will persuade them that the EU has a 
normative quality of its own.
In practice, EU politics frequently force a choice between the values of 
nationality and the values of integration. The public reception of integration 
issues might even over-emphasise the degree to which such a choice has to be 
made. Yet beyond justifications for the maintenance of the national veto in the 




























































































such normative implications of European union. Most authors adopt implicit 
positions on whether they consider the EU to serve the interests of states or 
whether states have to accepts limitations to their prerogatives for a higher 
value. While there is no space here to go further in this direction, what has been 
said will have been sufficient to make it clear why, in this paper, integration is 
regarded as having autonomous value.
A second premise of this paper - that European integration is a process 
rather than a set of institutions, policies and procedures - will be more easily 
acceptable to most observers. It will suffice here to point to the spatial and 
institutional dynamics which are likely to keep this process going for the 
foreseeable future. This is no small matter since, in the conventional 
understanding, constitutionalisation is by definition aimed at the design of fixed 
framework for political decision-making. Constitutionalisation itself might be a 
process, but its result - a constitution - is meant to limit rather than facilitate 
changes in political structures and procedures. Legitimising a process rather 
than a static entity therefore requires constitutional choices that are 
fundamentally different.
Reference has been made to the necessity of designing structures which 
conform to the values of democracy and effectiveness. This is difficult enough, 
requiring the kind of value trade-offs every federal-type system has to face 
(Kincaid, 1995). But in the current EU debate, many view the IGC as facing a 
further constitutional choice: the trade-off between ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ 
the European Union. This widening v. deepening debate, now that applications 
for membership from Mediterranean and East European countries are piling up, 
and that elaborate ‘pre-accession strategies’ have been devised, is clearly more 
than a catalyst for policy-reform. Enlargement certainly questions the viability 
of the CAP and other redistributive instruments. But, more fundamentally, 
enlargement raises questions about the very identity of the European Union. 
Asking "where does Europe end?" is inseparable from asking "what is 
Europe?". The fact that the EU’s borders are not finally set - never have been, 
and will not be for a the foreseeable future - means that its constitutionalisation 
is fundamentally different from otherwise comparable reform processes in 
national settings. European integration has created institutional structures and 
constructed a lasting arena for public policy-making, yet it remains essentially a 
process of integration. However federal it may turn out to become, it is not, and 
cannot be, a state.
European constitutional choice has to take account of this procedural nature 
of things. It is, at best, futile to try and define a process in static, and statist, 




























































































attempt was made. Integration needs to design a framework which is open- 
ended enough to allow future enlargements, while at the same time addressing 
the issues of concern and of interest to the current members. It must also be 
grounded in past choices. There is no tabula rasa from which a "European 
Constitution" could be designed. Reform needs to be based on past choices and 
present institutional realities - on both the national and European level. 
Proposals for radical reform ignoring this basic principle - such as the 1955 
Treaty for a European Political Community and the European Parliament’s 1984 
Draft Treaty for European Union - are bound to be studied by historians as 
instances of utopianism.
A final point here concerns the relationship between processes of 
integration and processes of globalisation. Part of the problem in reforming the 
EU has often been that is seen as an expression of globalisation and, by 
inference, as a sign of governments "giving in" to globalising social and 
economic forces which erode national sovereignty and national identity. This is 
unsurprising considering the amount of trade liberalisation the EU has been 
engaged in, and the way in which this has been justified as a response to global 
competitiveness. Yet it is crucial in the understanding of European governance 
presented here that integration is a dynamic reaction to globalisation. What is, 
on the one hand, a loss of national autonomy in social and economic regulation, 
is, on the other hand, the emergence of a system in which states can collectively 
regain some regulatory control over otherwise untrammelled processes of 
globalisation. The development of the European Union is, in this sense, not the 
capitulation of nation-states in the face of global markets and other 
transnational forces, but their rescue (Milward, 1992). Beyond that, the 
emergence of a specific policy-making arena on the European level is an 
expression of structural differentiation in the international system - 
transnational and supranational organisations are becoming significant 
structures for collective action (Cemy, 1995).
In this perspective, European integration is a process in which the 
translation of abstract democratic ideals needs to respond not just to citizens’ 
ability of participating in decision-making (which is diminishing in the EU), but 
also to the system’s capacity to facilitate public control over transnational 
economic and social processes (which is intensifying in the EU). As a 
consequence, there is a need to reformulate democratic theory - in a manner 
comparable to its transformation from city-state to nation-state - if we are to 
make normative sense of European integration (Dahl, 1995).
Part of the established landscape that needs to be moulded into 




























































































an exercise in the analysis of procedural reform, this paper will look at the 
European Commission. Much of the ‘democratic deficit’ debate is directed at 
the operation and involvement in EU decision-making of the European 
Parliament, but also the Commission - its relationship to Parliament (Westlake, 
1994), its degree of openness and transparency, its link with private interests 
(Mazey and Richardson, 1994; Obradovic, 1994) - is increasingly subject of 
academic interest. Yet, the Commission has not undergone any fundamental 
structural change since its inception. Its role and charter are largely unchanged, 
even though Council, Parliament and Court have metamorphosed significantly. 
The Commission is, therefore, a key aspects in reflections about constitutional 
choices the EU has to face.
Legitimising European Governance: Beyond Majoritarian Democracy
The public debate in recent years has converged around the notion that the EU’s 
problem with legitimacy is essentially its "democratic deficit". There are 
additional problems, such as a Court frequently regarded as ‘activist’ 
(Rasmussen, 1988) or the apparently limitless extension of competences 
(Pollack, 1994). Yet the essence of the problem are the limitations placed on the 
use of the national veto in the face of still rudimentary parliamentary powers. 
As a result, the bulk of legislative decisions in the EU are taken by qualified 
majority vote (QMV) in closed session by a collectivity of executives who are, 
at best, indirectly elected representatives. This, in a nutshell, sums up the EU’s 
democratic deficit.
There are many variations and further developments of this problems that 
need to be addressed - the distance between parliament and electorate, the size 
of constituencies, the problem of language, the relationship between national 
and European Parliaments, the use of referenda - but the general acceptance is 
that in order to legitimise a European Union operating on a regular QMV basis, 
a healthy injection of representative democracy is needed. Alternatively, those 
who object to an extension of the powers of the European Parliament, such as 
the last British governments under Conservative rule, also demand reductions in 
the use of QMV (Cabinet Office, 1996).
Yet, at a closer examination, the democratic legitimacy of the Union is 
increasingly seen as a highly complex issue, in which the "majoritarian avenue" 
might do damage to the European project (Dehousse, 1995). The underlying 
problem here is the conceptual history of liberal democracy. If we look at their 
origin and early practice, we see that structures and procedures of representative 




























































































are usually regarded. They have functioned also as elements in the constructions 
of nation-states. Indeed, in the liberal era, the conferral of democratic and other 
citizenship rights has been one of the most important instruments for state­
building. From the French Revolution onwards, the extension of parliamentary 
democracy was essential in the creation of strong central states based on a 
common national identity.
The conferral and the guarantee of citizenship rights requires final authority. 
There must also be boundary to the community upon which democratic rights 
and obligations are bestowed. Democratic theory itself cannot give any 
satisfactory answer to these questions (Barry, 1989). In this respect liberal 
democracy and representative governments necessarily needs to refer to pre­
draw state or communal boundaries, or else use what Barry calls "arguments of 
persuasion" to create new boundaries. But will then have to establish 
hierarchical structures for the implementation of democratic procedures. 
Borders and hierarchy are the hallmark of the modem state. And while the 
establishment of democratic regimes has not always created states, and while 
many states remain undemocratic, there are no examples for state-less forms of 
democracy.
But it is a particular sequence of historical events which has created this 
apparently inherent link between democracy and state-building. It certainly 
ought not to stop us looking for and thinking about ‘state-less’ forms of 
democracy, something which a growing number of scholars has undertaken 
(Rengger, 1993; Held, 1992; Tassin, 1992; Weale, 1995) In the particular 
context of a discussion about European constitutional choice, there must also be 
recognition that the linkages that have developed between liberal democracy 
and the modem state are, in part, contingent developments.
Historically, the establishment of liberal democracy came to be tied to, first, 
popular sovereignty and, later, national self-determination. Popular sovereignty 
demands that ‘the people’ have ultimate control over the institutions of state. 
National self-determination demands that each nation be recognised as ‘a 
people’ with the right to determine their own affairs. These two principles have 
been fused in the powerful combination of ideas and values that is the nation­
state. The revolutions of the 18th, 19th and 20th century each had their part in 
establishing the fusion of "people’s power" with "national liberation", joining 
citizenship with nationality and thus confusing nation, nation and "the people". 
As a result of these historical contingencies we are now faced with a generalised 
perception that the acquisition of democratic rights requires the establishment of 
a state - possibly a state within a federation, but preferably an independence 



























































































colonisations as much as from post-1989 démocratisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe. It is, indeed, the message from the debate about the British constitution, 
where the survival of the Union is juxtaposed to the extension of internal 
democracy.
As démocratisation becomes a dominant issue in the European Union, this 
historically constructed linkage between démocratisation and nation-state­
building. The German Constitutional Court judgement on the Maastricht Treaty, 
for example, spelled out the limits of further integration in terms of ‘national 
democracy’. Part of the argument was based on the idea that the sovereignty in 
Europe lay with the various state-peoples (Staatsvôlker). If democracy is thus 
grounded in the ethnic make-up of the continent, then it would be, by definition, 
impossible to democratise the European Union. Without people no state, 
without state no democracy without democracy no people - this reading of the 
constitutional situation in Germany and the wider Western Europe caused much 
criticism (Bryde, 1994; Weiler, 1995; Joerges, 1996; Ipsen, 1994; Frowein, 
1993), precisely because it forecloses the opportunities for increasing the 
progressive democratic reform of Union itself.
The debate surrounding this judgement, as well as the general critique of the 
linkage between ethnicity and democracy have attempted to show that it would 
be misleading, indeed even dangerous, to view the linkage between liberal 
democracy and the nation-state as inherent or automatic. As we have sought to 
show here, the link between democracy, national identity and statehood is a 
historical construction. It has been a powerful construction which has made it 
difficult to think about legitimate government and democracy outside the 
framework of the nation-state. Yet the fact that ‘national democracy’ is a social 
construction does not mean that it is easily toppled by secular processes such as 
globalisation or integration. Indeed, as we observe in the post-Cold War world, 
such processes induce "societal insecurity" in populations which increasingly 
have to confront the challenges of transnationalism without the protective 
shelter of ‘their’ state (Wæver et al., 1993). A revival of ethnic nationalism in 
the 1990s has been one of the consequences (Connor, 1994).
The force of social constructions is such that their consequences are ‘real’. 
The social and political practices induced by, and helping to maintain, social 
constructions such as the foundation of democracy in national self- 
determination must enter into the equations of constitutional engineering. In a 
constructivist understanding of social life, social practice is constituted through 
elements of structure. At the same time, structures are the outcome of the 
actions of social agents. As such they are subject to change and transformation 




























































































that in constitutional choices for the European Union can, on the one hand, 
induce changes in the established practices - i.e. expand the possibilities for 
transnational democracy - but that these have choices have, on the other hand, 
recognise the limits of those practices which continue to be reproduced, 
consciously or unconsciously, in current social life. If this recognition of 
established social practice is ignored, the European constitution is likely to 
regarded as illegitimate by a significant part of the population.
Recognition of historically constructed linkages such as the one between 
identity and democracy certainly limits the prospects for significant progress 
towards further integration and further démocratisation. But emphasising this is 
not the same as saying - as the German Constitutional Court has appeared to do 
- that there cannot be legitimate government outside the framework of 
democratically constituted nation-states. The limits imposed by pointing to the 
force of social constructions are less about the extend of change but about the 
speed. The constitutionalisation of European integration will have to recognise 
that the legitimacy of the Union cannot be detached from the social practices 
underlying the polity. Considering that these practices are usually only 
changing slowly, this is a strong argument in favour of introducing novel, 
democratic procedures only gradually while remaining sensitive to the values of 
integration and nationality in the legitimation of supranational governance.
Ignoring the implications of nationality for the legitimation of emerging 
polities is bound to lead to more serious problems than unsatisfactory policy- 
implementation or to a ‘bad press’ of Union institutions in Member States. On 
the global scale, the experience of démocratisation multi-national polities has 
regularly led to bloody and costly fragmentation processes The history of de­
colonisation - from the foundation of India to the current conflict in Chechnya - 
is rich in examples. In Western Europe, the spectre of fragmentation does not 
raise fears of bloodshed, yet is clearly antagonistic to the goal of integration 
which had the original aim of overcoming war and bloodshed on the continent. 
The basic dilemma that any constitutional choice of the European Union needs 
to address is the way in which supranational governance can be democratised, 
without jeopardising the integrative process. This is why the abstract ideal of a 
polity based on majoritarian parliamentary democracy needs to be adapted to 
the special requirements of EU governance.
What follows from this general discussion is that the legitimacy of the EU is 
based on three distinct values: democracy (the demand for public 
accountability), integration (the search for institutionalised solutions to 
transnational policy-making), and Member State autonomy (the maintenance of 




























































































of the "contradictions between intergovernmental bargaining, functional 
administration and democracy [which are] embedded in the treaties establishing 
the European Communities" (Wallace and Smith, 1995: p. 140). We have 
indicated how the values of democracy, integration and national autonomy are 
in conflict with each another. A European constitution aimed at enhancing the 
legitimacy of the system of supranational governance will therefore need to 
balance these carefully. The potential of democracy and public accountability 
for the legitimacy of the Union is apparent. The significance of system 
effectiveness and of national diversity in legitimating the EU require brief 
clarification.
European integration, having turned to the path of functional integration, 
requires positive results in the economic realm for its justification. Providing 
welfare benefits and economic growth is generally seen as a way of legitimising 
emergent polities. Lipset writes that to "attain legitimacy, what new 
democracies need above all is efficacy, particularly in the economic arena, but 
also in the polity. If they can keep the high road to economic development, they 
can keep heir political houses in order." (Lipset, 1994: 1). While this statement 
is directed at new democracies - those emerging from colonial or dictatorial rule 
- it rings true also with respect to the European Union. And clearly, the use of 
arguments about the economic benefit deriving from integration has been 
pervasive, both in theory (Kirchner and Schwartze, 1995) and in practice 
(Cecchini Report, 1988). Consequently, it has been argued that the greater 
efficiency of supranational decision-making can balance the ‘democratic deficit’ 
(Jachtenfuchs, 1995).
What remains is the EU’s recognition of national identity and state 
autonomy - what is termed here "the maintenance of national diversity". 
National interests are, of course, well entrenched in Council of Ministers and 
IGC, but it is worth noting that despite this entrenchment there is an increasing 
suspicion among national publics and elites that national diversity is under 
threat from the integration process. In response, it is usually easy, but 
unsatisfactory, to oppose further integration and démocratisation. But a number 
of authors have pointed to ways in which integrative progress could be 
organised in an "autonomy-respecting" manner (Ziirn und Preuss, 1995; 
Scharpf, 1994). One way suggested would combine majority and nationality 
principle in the European Parliament (Katz, 1994). Other authors have 
developed the consociational model for the European context (Taylor, 1991; 
Chryssochoou, 1995).
The dilemma of European constitutional choice results from in-built 




























































































supranational decision-making and maintenance of national diversity. 
Significant progress on each of these values is bound to jeopardise the 
realization of the other two, and that as a result of one-dimensional reform the 
legitimacy of the system will be threatened. Below the repercussions of this 
dilemma will be discussed with respect to current institutional choices. But the 
tensions induced by the contradictory demands of this triangle can also be seen 
in the shifts which the integration process has undergone in the past. As the 
Community has attempted to legitimise its functioning by relying too heavily on 
one aspect, legitimacy has suffered, in the long run through the neglect for the 
other angles of the triangle.
In the 1950s and early 1960s there was a high degree popular support and 
integrative progress, but it was seen as threatening national autonomy and had 
to be successively down-scaled. In the 1970s and early 1980s, little integrative 
progress was made, but the EC’s ability to recognise national diversity was 
demonstrated through enlargement. Democratic values received a boost through 
the introduction of direct elections to the EP. Yet, the "Common Market" was 
demonstrably ineffective in the face of economic crisis, with the associated 
problems for legitimacy. Later in the 1980s, there was progress on the 
integration front with the ‘1992’ programme - with credits for the EC in 
facilitating the export-led boom - but insufficient progress towards a "Citizens’ 
Europe" led to the crisis of legitimacy after Maastricht. In 1996, the legitimacy 
of the Union is threatened, once more, by its inability to engage actively the 
economic problems of the day, in particular the crisis of unemployment.
European integration has muddled through these problems in the past, and it 
would be misleading to draw an image of concurrent crises. This section merely 
intended to demonstrate the complex and multi-faceted nature of legitimacy in 
the European Union. A one-dimensional extension of parliamentary procedures 
- giving full co-decision making powers to the European Parliament - might 
lead to a centralisation of power on the European level. Increasing the 
participation of national - and regional - parliaments carries the risk of slowing 
down or stalling effective decision-making in the EU. Either solution, or a 
combination of both, would enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy. But it 
would jeopardise, at the same time, the legitimacy the system derives from 
producing effective policy-outputs and/or the way in which it maintains 
recognition of national diversity and autonomy (Dehousse, 1995). It might act, 
in other words, as the catalyst towards the kind of systemic fragmentation that 
démocratisation has shown itself to be in other historical or geographical 
contexts.
This is not to say that there ought not to be an extension of parliamentary 




























































































unfinished project, and political pressure in this direction needs to continue. But 
to point to the particular dilemma of European governance developed above 
implies that - unless we are prepared to see the EU system turning into a state - 
it cannot be legitimised entirely through majoritarian democratic procedures. 
Reforms and constitutional choices will need to adapt the ideals of liberal 
democracy to the specific conditions of supranational governance. What this 
means in practice is that calls for a "democratic Europe" ought to be replaced by 
a debate about balancing integration and démocratisation. An important element 
in the a debate about continuous and gradual reform is the examination of the 
role and functioning of each institution, the management its relationships with 
other supranational institution, with national governments and with individual 
citizens. Such comprehensive examination of individual institutions is one way 
of establishing the constitutional needs of European governance, Below follows 
an outline of such an analysis of the European Commission.
Multiple Accountability of the European Commission
Above, a triangular model of EU legitimacy has been developed, arguing that 
the values of democratic governance, effective integration and national 
autonomy need to be balanced in order to maintain legitimacy. Each of these 
has an independent normative value, and the pursuit of one at the expenses of 
another will damage rather than raise the legitimacy. Such a triangular 
conception of EU legitimacy neatly places the main institutions: the Council of 
Ministers as the guardian of national autonomy, the EP as the guardian of 
democratic governance, and Commission, together with the ECJ, as the 
guardian of effective integration.
This inter-institutional model of EU legitimation is easily supported by a 
conventional institutional perspective. The EP derives its legitimacy and 
authority from direct elections which to some extent bypass the national 
political circuit (even if this is still more a formally than an applied rule). Party 
federations are the main aggregates of political power within the chamber, and 
the resultant political groups cut across national boundaries. While the 
Parliament supports a maximalist integrative agenda, it is prepared to jettison 
integrative progress as much as national sentiments when it comes to the 
achievement or protection of democratic procedure and parliamentary status. 
Disputes over the budget have, in the past, been the clearest example of that. In 
equal measure, the Council of Ministers is an organ concerned with advancing 
integration and political representation, (if aggregated at a very high level), 
while at the same time it is the arena in which individual state representatives 




























































































its work which has turned it into an often sceptical, defensive and occasionally 
even non-co-operative actor in the integration process.
The Commission, finally, does pursue communitarian goals and is charged 
with the administration of common policies and the supervision of 
implementation in the member states. As a result, it has come into close contact 
with actors on the regional and local level, as well as with non-state actors in 
Brussels. Regularly it has been in conflict with the Member States, not in the 
least before of the European Court, but it is also frequently charged with 
violations of the principles of transparency and openness in the EU. Its 
allegiance it less to the specific interests of either Member States or ‘the 
people’, but rather to the much more abstract acquis communitaire. Together 
with the Court, the Commission produces legislation and supervises its 
implementation, independent of Member State interests or popular pressure.
But while this perspective shows is that each of the central institutions of 
the EU - Council, Parliament and Commission - does, at a superficial level, 
perform a specific and discrete normative agenda, it in practice harbours 
reflexes and organisational logics which are in contrast if not in conflict with 
these. The image of a ‘division of labour’, then, does make some sense of the 
high degree of consensualism and inter-connectedness of the European 
institutions - in order to maintain overall legitimacy all the institutions simply 
have to respect each others’ specific normative role - it still is a mighty 
simplification. Constitutional ‘divisions of labour’ are never that neat, and the 
EU system is no exemption. Indeed, if anything, it demonstrates the opposite.
The reproduction of this inter-institutional logic can also be identified on 
the intra-institutional setting. In fact, each of the institutions can be shown to 
possess democratic, and integrative and a national logics. Consequently, the 
balancing act of legitimation is performed not only on the level of the inter- 
institutional relations, but also, and perhaps more crucially, within each of the 
institutions. In maintaining its own institutional legitimacy against the frequent 
desire of creating a hierarchical, simpler and perhaps more democratic regimes, 
the Commission has consistently defended a functionalist structure that, it could 
be argued, has pursued integration at any costs. At the same time are frequent 
claims that units within the Commission, and even the institution as a whole fall 
under the spell of individual governments when it comes to the pursuit of 
specific policies. Clearly, the Commission is different things to different people. 
In looking at the Commission in slightly more detail, it is important to recognise 
at the outset that the role of guardian of the integration process remains the 
oldest and most important tasks of the Commission. Despite a lot of action and 




























































































autonomy), the pursuit of “ever-closer union” remains the primary object of the 
European Commission. But a closer look reveals that within the Commission 
other forces are at work, which are often hidden from view by the image of the 
Commission as a unitary actor. In line with the triangular perspective on EU 
legitimacy developed here, three aspects of Commission activity can be 
identified and related to discrete legitimation agendas. This distinction is 
between a ‘parliamentary’, a ‘technocratic’ and a ‘diplomatic’ Commission. 
While the presence of such contradictory agendas clearly bodes ill for 
institutional coherence, the conclusion here is not that greater uniformity is 
called for. Instead, the continuation of these rival legitimation agendas within 
the Commission is necessary, since it is the balance between all three of them, 
rather than the preponderance of any one, which constitutes the institution’s 
overall legitimacy.
The ‘parliamentary’ Commission does in fact exhibit a strong and growing 
tendency to act as a representative government, with public access to internal 
Commission activity, the existence of party links and the significance of 
parliamentary scrutiny having grown massively in the 1990s (Lord and Hix, 
1995). After Maastricht, when during the difficult ratification process it become 
clear that the functional nature of the European project of the 1980s had left the 
people behind, all the institutions have sought to remedy the ‘democratic 
deficit’. In the intervening period, the Commission, in particular, has felt the 
need to respond to the critique of technocracy and democratic deficit. An 
elaborate programme of greater openness, transparency and subsidiarity has 
been the result (Preston, 1997).
This demonstrates that the development of a direct Commission-public 
relationship is accelerating. The various channels - the European Parliament, the 
intermediary social groups and organisations, the provision of access to, and 
certainty about, administrative procedures within the Commission - are 
combined attempts at making the Commission more accountable to citizens. 
But, as was pointed out above with respect to the comitology structure, this is 
not an easy process, and the Commission still has a long way to go before not 
only relating directly to the public, but actually transmitting the impression that 
citizens are in any meaningful way able to hold the Commission to account.
By contrast, the presence of an ‘intergovernmental’ Commission is 
demonstrated by a number of unique features. One is that the appointment 
structure in the upper echelons of the Commission appears to be dominated by 
concerns about nationality more than political affiliation. The appointment of 
the Commissioners themselves is, of course, explicitly based on nationality. 




























































































political systems and the EU bureaucracy. While on the one hand operating as 
something like ambassadors of the EU when they return to the national political 
circuit, they are also widely regarded as the most appropriate entry-point for 
political interests from the member state level when they seek influence in 
Brussels. The increasing incidence of voting in the college of Commissioners 
regularly sees the Commission divided along national lines to the point were the 
line up of ministers in the Council and the Commissioners in the college behind 
declared national positions is taken for granted. A further aspect of the 
Commissions internal intergovemmentalism is that much of the EU’s regulatory 
policy-making is conducted in the ambit of comitology, in which the 
Commission participates, but which is strongly guided by Member States’ 
interests in maintaining control over the policy-making process.
At the same time, the technocratic character of the Commission has not 
really subsided. In a number of areas, the Commission has tried enhanced its 
independent character. While some areas of Commission activity have been 
opened to the influence of party politics, others have been removed from 
partisan politics. One aspect here is the growth and rising intensity of scientific 
advice on which the Commission relies (Joerges, 1994). Another is 
Commission’s activity in the fields such as monetary or competition policy 
which are based on institutional independence. With respect to the latter, one 
observer has complained that the Commission appears as “the master of its own 
procedural destiny” (Brent, 1995).
Since the Commission cannot hope to fully satisfy the demands of 
democratic legitimacy and member state interests, there is merit in the search 
for alternative models. As one way of escaping the contradictions of multiple 
accountability, greater institutional independence is being considered as a ‘third 
way’ of legitimising the Commission’s activity. The establishment of 
independent regulatory authority removed from the political circuit of decision­
making. In a sense, it means turning the potentially paralysing effect of having 
to account to two ‘masters’ into a virtue. The aim would be to remove the 
Commission's regulatory activity from the floor of partisan politics, and to 
achieve legitimation through greater independence rather than greater 
accountability (Majone, 1994). In that respect, the Commission forms the core 
of a European Union that can be seen as the "indepeent fourth branch of 
government" (Majone, 1993).
Recent developments indicate this path as one of potential in the future 
design of the Commission. A number of independent "Decentralized Agencies" 
were set up in 1993, even though this was mainly for low-key tasks like the 




























































































in a variety of sectors (Falke, 1995). There are demands for parts of the 
Commission to be turned into independent agencies. There have been repeated 
calls, for example, taking merger control out of what is seen as a too political 
process of decision-making (Ehlermann, 1994). Others go further and demand 
that the Commission be split up into various such independent agencies: a 
European Trade Commission, a European Environmental Agency, a European 
Cartel Office, etc. (George, 1995; Vibert, 1995). The case for such an 
‘unbundling’ of the Commission is argued with reference to the increasing 
diversity of tasks, and - again - the need to remove delicate decisions from 
political influences.
This does not seem to find much sympathy with most national delegations 
and the Commission itself (Council of the European Union, 1995; European 
Commission, 1996). Clearly, greater institutional independence, linked to a 
more explicit administrative code of conduct, can only be one element in the 
legitimation of Commission activity. Greater use of comitology, a structured 
relationship to the European Parliament and more direct contact and 
communication with individual citizens will also have to be features of the new 
Commission. In other words, the Commission will continue to be a hybrid 
organisation, combining supranational and intergovernmental elements.
Conclusion: Squaring the Triangle?
In all its complexity, the Amsterdam Treaty appears at first sight to have pushed 
the Commission along the ‘parliamentary’ avenue. With the EP achieving 
greater co-decision powers vis-a-vis the Council and enhancing its powers vis- 
a-vis the Commission as part of a revised investiture procedure, the expectation 
is that the Commission will become more accountable to Parliament. That is 
certainly the impression of those within the Commission who are responsible 
for parliamentary liaison and who have seen their workload exponentially 
increase in the past few years. Yet, at the same time, the clauses in the new 
Treaty which govern the number of Commissioners tell a different story. The 
larger countries have linked the reduction in the number of ‘their’ 
Commissioners from two to one to the reform of voting in the Council - a clear 
sign (if any was needed) that the future legitimacy of the Commission hinges on 
the element of Member State representation that goes on within it.
There is in fact, very little to suggest that the conflict between 
‘parliamentary’ and ‘intergovernmental’ modes will not continue to co-exist 
within a Commission that is becoming more internally diverse and divided as its 




























































































‘independent’ in relying on its unique procedural expertise and its central 
position as a broker among the multiple policy-networks of the EU, will 
therefore also be necessary to balance the tension between overall centralisation 
- which is induced by the move towards majoritarianism - and fragmentation - 
which results from the importance of national positions within the Commission. 
A degree of independence from either of these forces is what might provide 
some slight relief for an institutions that might otherwise be tempted (or forced) 
down one or the other of these slippery slopes - with the potentially disastrous 
results for the legitmacy of the Union as a whole, as discussed in the first part of 
this paper.
Even as it is, the presence of such three very different organisational modes 
within the same institution will lead to internal contradiction and to 
inconsistencies in policy-output. But to the extent that European regulatory 
activity in the future will always require member state support, wider public 
acceptance and a degree of independent authority, internal contradiction and the 
lack of coherence is the price the Commission will have to pay to remain the 
key actor in the development of European governance it has been in the past 
decade, and to contribute positively to the legitimation of the EU as a whole.
Thomas Christiansen 
Centre for European Studies
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